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Abstract
We report the first empirical data showing a significant amount of double conjunction fallacies in physicians’ prob-
ability judgments concerning prognosis and diagnosis. Our results support the hypothesis that physicians’ probability
judgments are guided by assessments of evidential impact between diagnostic conditions and clinical signs.
Moreover, we show that, contrary to some influential views, double conjunction fallacies represent an experimentally
replicable reasoning bias. We discuss how the phenomenon eludes major current accounts of uncertain reasoning in
medicine and beyond and how it relates to clinical practice.
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The judgment that a pair of hypotheses (h1&h2) is more
likely to obtain jointly as compared to one of them (e.g.,
h1) is called conjunction fallacy (CF), and it is perhaps
the most well-known kind of error in the psychology of
probabilistic reasoning. Indeed, the comparison between
a conjunction and a conjunct is a simple task, which does
not require use of Bayes’s theorem or any other challen-
ging computation. Accordingly, since it was first
described, the CF has been considered a paramount illus-
tration of the limitations of human thinking (the viola-
tion of ‘‘the simplest and the most basic qualitative law
of probability’’1(p293)).
The CF has been replicated in various real-life set-
tings. In their seminal inquiry on the topic, Tversky and
Kahneman1 also provided a clear illustration in the medi-
cal domain: most internists in their study maintained that
a 55-year-old woman was more likely to experience the
combination of ‘‘dyspnea and hemiparesis’’ than ‘‘hemi-
paresis’’ after a pulmonary embolism. In more than 100
studies on the topic, we were able to find only one further
CF scenario with medical content: about half of early
medical students estimated the probability that a patient
with a common cold would have experienced ‘‘runny
nose and diarrhea’’ as higher than ‘‘diarrhea.’’2
A double conjunction fallacy (DCF) occurs when a
conjunction of statements is judged more likely than
both conjuncts, thus implying two simultaneously falla-
cious judgments. Most of single CF scenarios, including
those from medicine mentioned above, do not support
this phenomenon. However, Tversky and Kahneman1
gave an important illustration of DCF with their ‘‘mile
run’’ scenario: when considering the next race of Peter, a
young college runner who is training and had already
run the mile in 4:06, 48% of participants ranked ‘‘Peter
will run the second half-mile under 1:55 min and will
complete the mile under 4 min’’ (h1&h2) as more prob-
able than both single conjuncts ‘‘will run the second half-
mile under 1:55 min’’ (h1) and ‘‘will complete the mile
under 4 min’’ (h2).
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